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Abstract
In this paper we explore corporate real estate ownership internationally. Based on a sample of 4,636 companies
from 18 industries and 9 countries we document distinct patterns and trends in the corporate ownership level of
real estate. Real estate ownership appears to be driven by industrial rather than national differences, with
corporate real estate ratios ranging between 0.13 for Business Services and 0.63 for the Mining sector. Overall,
real estate ownership appears to be decreasing over time, which may be due to the gaining popularity of lease
alternatives. When analyzing the stock performance of the companies in our sample, we discover a significantly
negative relationship between real estate ownership and a firm’s systematic risk. Idiosyncratic risk bears no
significant relationship with real estate ownership. With respect to stock returns our results show that returns are
lowest among firms with the highest real estate ownership levels in each industry. After controlling for the
variation in risks, the remaining return patterns differ strongly across industries, with a significantly negative
relationship between stock outperformance and real estate ownership for Communications and Business
Services and a positive but not significant relationship for Transportation.
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1. Introduction
Corporate real estate forms one of the largest asset classes in the world. The value of
European corporate real estate has been estimated to exceed the total European insti-
tutional real estate investment portfolio. For example, Krumm and Linneman (2001)
estimated the value of Dutch corporate real estate holdings to be approximately 220
billion, whereas the real estate portfolios of Dutch institutional investors amount to less
than a third of this value. According to these authors one of the prime reasons for the
magnitude of these corporate portfolios has been the absence of well-developed com-
mercial real estate markets. For most of the last century European companies had no
choice but to own their land and buildings. Indeed, according to a recent study by DTZ
(2003) approximately 70% of European businesses are owner-occupiers. In contrast, the
equivalent figure for US firms is only 30%. The same report estimates the total value of
corporate real estate in Germany, France and the United Kingdom at approximately
1,000 billion, 700 billion and 710 billion, respectively. By comparison, IPD (2003aYc)
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estimates the total combined market capitalization of the institutional property portfolio
in these countries at 117 billion, 92 billion and 226 billion, respectively.1
The magnitude of corporate real estate assets is such that the costs associated with
owning these properties have become second only to payroll costs in many organizations
(Veale, 1989). Despite that, and despite the fact that real estate accounts for 25 to 40
percent of the total assets of large firms (Zeckhauser and Silverman, 1983), it is generally
not very important to corporate management. Corporate real estate has commonly been
seen as a necessary evil, which requires the commitment of large capital spending for
relatively long periods of time. Companies typically build up a real estate portfolio to
meet the needs of their principal business activities and after acquiring their properties
most firms spend little time evaluating them.
In a survey of more than seven hundred executives of large US firms, Arthur Anderson
& Company (1993) reported that the vast majority of the respondents did not feel a need
to link strategic real estate planning and business planning. Very few companies
produced recurring reports on the performance and value of their real estate assets,
suggesting that real estate was still not managed efficiently in the early nineties. The only
market actors appearing to be interested in this inefficiency were corporate raiders.
Ambrose (1990) reported on the role of real estate in the takeover market. He docu-
mented that corporate real estate holdings increased the likelihood of a firm becoming
a takeover candidate. Apparently raiders were aware of the hidden values available
through the restructuring of badly managed corporate real estate assets.
In the last decade, however, executives seem to have been rediscovering their property
assets and have looked at them more critically. As a result, more and more firms have
opted for corporate leases, which decrease the capital burden and enhance corporate
flexibility. Manning (1991) discussed the buy versus lease dilemma and has reported a
trend towards leasing.
The effects of these decisions on the risk and return to stockholders have been studied
only sporadically.2 Glascock et al. (1989, 1991) and Myer et al. (1992) have used stan-
dard event study methodology to analyze market reactions to the announcements of
corporate real estate divestures. Both studies find a positive abnormal return, which
suggests that stockholders appear to benefit when companies sell their properties. By the
same token Slovin et al. (1990) and Rutherford (1990) document positive price reactions
to the announcement of sale-leasebacks of real estate. These event studies all indicate
that stockholders appreciate management efforts to restructure their business real estate.
However, this does not simultaneously imply that real estate ownership harms a firm’s
stock performance in general. These studies analyze specific events in which manage-
ment has stepped in, in order to improve their businesses. These events may be preceded
by situations in which inefficiencies were extremely high and may therefore not relate to
real estate ownership in the usual course of events, but more to signals of a change in
general management quality. On the other hand, these studies do support a trend towards
corporate leases, which can stimulate real estate securitization. Companies that sell their
real estate holdings will need an alternative such as a lease contract. This will increase
the demand for commercial real estate leases, supplied by institutional investors and
specialized real estate companies.
430 BROUNEN AND EICHHOLTZ
Although the advantages of such flexible lease strategies are apparent, empirical
evidence on the matching financial gains is scant. The only papers that have looked at the
relationship between corporate real estate ownership and firm performance have so far
been Deng and Gyourko (1999) and Seiler et al. (2001). They have looked into this
matter for the United States market and document a negative relationship between real
estate ownership and a firm’s beta, but they find no significant relationship with firm
outperformance. Following their example, we will examine corporate real estate holdings
and the performance of non-real estate companies.
This paper explores the extent to which corporate real estate holdings vary across
industries in an international context and whether and how these holdings affect the
stock performance of non-real estate companies. First, we will analyze a broad data
sample of firms active in 18 different industries based in 9 countries around the world:
Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom,
Canada and the United States. By comparing corporate real estate ownership levels in
these countries we can find out whether structural variations in these ownership levels
exist internationally. The second portion of this study will focus on the risk-return
profiles of the firms in the sample in order to investigate the nature of the relationship
between real estate ownership and firm performance. We will use a two stage least
squares methodology to investigate the performance effects of corporate real estate
holdings.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we will present
information regarding the data sample we use in the analysis. Section 3 discusses the
methodology that will be applied, while Section 4 presents the empirical results. Finally,
the paper ends with summarizing conclusions.
2. Data description
For this study we gathered stock performance, dividend, and balance sheet information
for 4,636 companies from the Compustat tapes provided by Standard and Poor’s. We did
that for 1992, 1995, 1998 and 2000. The sample includes firms based in Australia, Hong
Kong, Japan, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the
United States.3 All firms were categorized into 18 industrial sectors using two-digit SIC
classifications.4
The statistics regarding the sample breakdown are presented in Table 1, which reports
the sample distributions across countries and industries by number of firms. The table
shows that the number of firms in certain categories, like Personal Services and Agri-
culture, is rather small, indicating that one has to be careful when interpreting the em-
pirical results for these sectors.
For each firm we collected information concerning the following variables: country of
origin, industry classification, total stock return, market capitalization, leverage, book
value of assets, and book value of FProperty, Plant and Equipment_ (PPE). Leverage is
computed as the ratio of total debt and the product of common shares outstanding and
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share price. To quantify relative real estate ownership we constructed a corporate real
estate ratio (CRER), which divides Compustat’s (PPE) variable5 by the book value of a
firm’s total assets:6
CRER ¼ PPE
Total Assets
ð1Þ
Besides the firm-specific data, we also need general stock market indices and risk-free
rates of return in order to determine systematic risk and outperformance of the
companies in the sample. To enable international comparison of results, we have selected
the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Indices as stock market proxies. One-
month government bill rates serve as the risk-free rate of return. Everything was done in
local currencies, and on a monthly frequency.
Table 2 reports the aggregated results for corporate real estate ownership. The
observed CRER-values clearly illustrate that the deviation in national means regarding
the same industry is relatively low and insignificant. But when comparing real estate
holdings across industries the results exhibit very large differences, with CRER-values in
Table 1. Sample distribution by number of companies.
SIC-Codes AU CA FR GR HK JP NL UK US Total %
0100Y0299 Agriculture 1 1 8 0 0 4 0 7 8 29 1
1000Y1499 Mining 74 98 7 3 0 10 0 27 99 318 7
2000Y2199 Food and
tobacco
16 18 31 25 5 146 9 33 67 350 8
2200Y2299 Textile 0 0 12 9 5 58 3 15 22 124 3
2700Y2799 Publishing 7 9 3 6 3 28 6 25 45 132 3
2800Y2899 Chemicals 15 36 24 32 4 227 4 39 247 628 14
2900Y2999 Petroleum 3 6 4 2 1 11 2 3 16 48 1
3600Y3699 Electronics 8 29 28 41 12 235 5 48 270 676 15
4400Y4599 Transportation 3 8 5 4 7 36 4 16 34 117 3
4800Y4899 Communication 17 26 16 14 22 7 18 7 132 259 6
4900Y4999 Utilities 6 14 9 23 4 22 0 25 135 238 5
5800Y5899 Restaurants 0 1 5 0 3 61 0 18 39 127 3
5400Y5499 Food-stores 2 5 6 3 0 69 2 11 21 119 3
7000Y7099 Hotels 5 3 10 2 5 12 0 11 13 61 1
7200Y7299 Personal
services
1 0 1 0 0 6 0 4 9 21 0
7300Y7399 Business
services
31 40 109 126 0 172 27 149 455 1,109 24
8000Y8099 Health care 6 4 4 7 0 3 0 4 47 75 2
8700Y9799 Business
advisory
10 6 26 14 0 46 6 39 58 205 4
Total 205 304 308 311 71 1,153 86 481 1,717 4,636
% of sum total 4% 7% 7% 7% 2% 25% 2% 10% 37%
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Table 2. Corporate real estate ownership ratios by industry, country, and year.
AU CA FR GR HK JP NL UK US Total stdev
All sectors
1992 0.43 0.43 0.17 0.29 0.25 0.30 0.36 0.40 0.32 0.34 0.26
1995 0.38 0.44 0.19 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.37 0.31 0.33 0.24
1998 0.38 0.44 0.18 0.20 0.40 0.32 0.28 0.33 0.29 0.32 0.24
2000 0.35 0.41 0.18 0.17 0.30 0.31 0.22 0.29 0.26 0.29 0.22
Agriculture
1992 Y 0.62 0.18 Y Y 0.27 Y 0.30 0.56 0.43 0.23
1995 0.30 0.28 0.16 Y Y 0.47 Y 0.35 0.55 0.41 0.22
1998 0.41 0.19 0.18 Y Y 0.50 Y 0.49 0.49 0.39 0.24
2000 0.46 0.21 0.17 Y Y 0.49 Y 0.54 0.49 0.41 0.25
Mining
1992 0.52 0.68 0.40 0.42 Y 0.33 Y 0.67 0.66 0.63 0.21
1995 0.53 0.72 0.28 0.27 Y 0.33 0.65 0.68 0.69 0.64 0.23
1998 0.58 0.77 0.32 0.34 Y 0.36 0.72 0.48 0.71 0.66 0.25
2000 0.55 0.74 0.40 0.34 Y 0.34 0.65 0.49 0.69 0.63 0.23
Food and tobacco
1992 0.37 0.29 0.22 0.39 0.53 0.35 0.47 0.49 0.36 0.37 0.15
1995 0.37 0.32 0.21 0.37 0.54 0.38 0.38 0.45 0.37 0.37 0.16
1998 0.40 0.33 0.21 0.37 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.51 0.36 0.38 0.17
2000 0.41 0.34 0.24 0.35 0.43 0.39 0.30 0.48 0.37 0.38 0.16
Textile
1992 Y Y 0.27 0.43 0.48 0.28 0.29 0.37 0.39 0.33 0.11
1995 Y Y 0.20 0.32 0.26 0.30 0.38 0.36 0.40 0.32 0.12
1998 Y Y 0.23 0.30 0.27 0.33 0.33 0.40 0.39 0.34 0.14
2000 Y Y 0.23 0.29 0.24 0.37 0.32 0.35 0.36 0.34 0.15
Publishing
1992 0.25 0.41 0.23 0.16 0.45 0.33 0.43 0.32 0.30 0.32 0.18
1995 0.28 0.35 0.23 0.16 0.76 0.33 0.36 0.30 0.27 0.31 0.17
1998 0.25 0.34 0.29 0.24 0.68 0.37 0.26 0.22 0.23 0.28 0.19
2000 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.38 0.32 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.24 0.17
Chemicals
1992 0.33 0.32 0.28 0.31 Y 0.30 0.46 0.38 0.28 0.30 0.15
1995 0.38 0.28 0.24 0.31 0.52 0.30 0.45 0.34 0.28 0.29 0.15
1998 0.34 0.28 0.22 0.27 0.36 0.33 0.50 0.30 0.26 0.29 0.16
2000 0.29 0.28 0.21 0.26 0.32 0.32 0.45 0.26 0.22 0.27 0.16
Petroleum
1992 0.73 0.73 0.31 0.09 Y 0.32 0.60 0.49 0.61 0.50 0.22
1995 0.45 0.70 0.28 0.22 Y 0.36 0.59 0.44 0.62 0.49 0.23
1998 0.72 0.76 0.29 0.25 Y 0.36 0.43 0.45 0.61 0.51 0.22
2000 0.58 0.71 0.26 0.40 Y 0.36 0.32 0.40 0.53 0.47 0.19
Electronics
1992 Y 0.22 0.21 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.30 0.31 0.24 0.26 0.12
1995 Y 0.21 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.23 0.24 0.12
1998 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.13
2000 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.22 0.21 0.26 0.29 0.21 0.18 0.22 0.13
Transportation
1992 0.53 0.62 0.29 0.66 0.42 0.51 0.63 0.48 0.61 0.55 0.20
1995 0.57 0.54 0.18 0.59 0.38 0.50 0.59 0.51 0.56 0.52 0.20
1998 0.41 0.47 0.28 0.65 0.43 0.53 0.45 0.58 0.59 0.53 0.21
2000 0.37 0.39 0.29 0.55 0.35 0.54 0.42 0.59 0.57 0.52 0.23
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Table 2. Continued.
AU CA FR GR HK JP NL UK US Total stdev
Communication
1992 0.32 0.46 0.29 0.24 Y 0.52 0.83 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.25
1995 0.36 0.48 0.25 0.46 Y 0.53 0.68 0.34 0.37 0.40 0.24
1998 0.24 0.43 0.14 0.18 0.56 0.50 0.61 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.23
2000 0.24 0.42 0.13 0.13 0.37 0.36 0.42 0.23 0.36 0.32 0.22
Utilities
1992 0.57 0.72 0.13 0.53 0.84 0.78 Y 0.74 0.74 0.71 0.19
1995 0.52 0.73 0.41 0.53 0.75 0.77 Y 0.77 0.71 0.70 0.18
1998 0.55 0.75 0.41 0.43 0.67 0.78 Y 0.72 0.62 0.63 0.22
2000 0.51 0.69 0.40 0.39 0.55 0.74 Y 0.65 0.55 0.57 0.22
Restaurants
1992 Y 0.45 0.05 Y Y 0.40 Y 0.85 0.61 0.53 0.22
1995 Y 0.44 0.06 Y 0.35 0.39 Y 0.84 0.72 0.56 0.24
1998 Y 0.45 0.36 Y 0.32 0.41 Y 0.81 0.72 0.57 0.24
2000 Y 0.53 0.41 Y 0.29 0.43 Y 0.78 0.73 0.56 0.23
Foodstores
1992 0.49 0.51 0.31 Y Y 0.39 0.43 0.73 0.44 0.44 0.17
1995 0.40 0.52 0.36 Y Y 0.43 0.45 0.64 0.51 0.47 0.17
1998 0.43 0.40 0.37 0.52 Y 0.45 0.47 0.65 0.53 0.48 0.16
2000 0.41 0.39 0.36 0.47 Y 0.46 0.47 0.66 0.52 0.48 0.17
Hotels
1992 0.98 0.49 0.46 0.10 0.82 0.56 Y 0.79 0.45 0.58 0.28
1995 0.93 0.44 0.45 0.39 0.80 0.61 Y 0.81 0.50 0.61 0.26
1998 0.52 0.60 0.40 0.51 0.73 0.59 Y 0.85 0.76 0.65 0.26
2000 0.51 0.42 0.44 0.33 0.55 0.64 Y 0.83 0.71 0.62 0.26
Personal services
1992 0.30 Y Y Y Y 0.46 Y 0.52 0.34 0.40 0.14
1995 0.29 Y Y Y Y 0.49 Y 0.51 0.34 0.40 0.15
1998 0.24 Y 0.02 Y Y 0.46 Y 0.71 0.27 0.40 0.22
2000 0.09 Y 0.01 Y Y 0.47 Y 0.61 0.25 0.35 0.22
Business services
1992 0.65 0.18 0.11 0.32 Y 0.26 0.16 0.34 0.19 0.23 0.19
1995 0.29 0.21 0.10 0.31 Y 0.28 0.11 0.29 0.18 0.21 0.18
1998 0.21 0.17 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.27 0.11 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.16
2000 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.23 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.15
Healthcare
1992 0.28 0.20 Y 0.66 Y 0.24 Y 0.51 0.37 0.36 0.21
1995 0.31 0.44 Y 0.73 Y 0.30 Y 0.43 0.30 0.33 0.21
1998 0.37 0.28 0.16 0.51 Y 0.31 Y 0.58 0.27 0.31 0.24
2000 0.36 0.26 0.25 0.50 Y 0.34 Y 0.48 0.28 0.32 0.24
Business advisory
1992 0.31 0.29 0.01 0.27 Y 0.20 0.24 0.29 0.20 0.22 0.14
1995 0.27 0.18 0.22 0.25 Y 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.16 0.20 0.14
1998 0.26 0.15 0.12 0.14 Y 0.25 0.25 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.15
2000 0.20 0.18 0.11 0.14 Y 0.27 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.16 0.14
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the year 2000 ranging from 0.13 for Business Services to 0.63 for the Mining sector.
However, one has to be careful when comparing these ratios across industries: the ratio
does not only include property, but also plant and equipment, and it is quite likely that at
least a part of the high ratio for categories like Mining, Utilities, and Petroleum can be
attributed to plant and equipment, rather than property.
Judging from Table 2 one may conclude that companies in the Business Services and
Business Advisory sectors have little need to own the buildings in which they operate. One
obvious explanation is the type of real estate that is needed by these companies: they
mainly use office space, for which a great supply of leasable space is offered inter-
nationally. Moreover, the office is not likely to be a strategic asset. On the other hand,
companies which are active in heavy industries like Utilities, Mining and Petroleum are
forced to own a large part of the real estate assets they use, since the industrial real estate
they need is often tailor-made and therefore not suited for standardized lease contracts. For
example, if Shell desires to expand its business in France it will need to build its own
industrial complexes, since the supply of suitable lease plants is low or non-existent.
Besides high ratios for industrial sectors, we also document high levels of real estate
ownership within the Hotel, Restaurant and Foodstore businesses, which may be explained
by the fact that real estate assets represent a vital and strategic asset in these sectors, with
the exact nature and location of the real estate being of very high importance for the
success of these companies.
Across countries, the variation in relative real estate holdings is less distinct. Germany
and France have the lowest average ratios of 0.17 and 0.18, respectively, while the
Canadian and Australian firms in the sample have respective average CRERs of 0.41 and
0.35. However, this is mainly due to the predominance of the Mining sector in these
countries, and does not imply that other companies own relatively large amounts of
property as well.
Regarding the time variance in the CRER-observations the results support earlier
studies claiming a trend towards leasing. When comparing the change in the aggregated
industry means over time we document a distinctly decreasing trend for 11 out of
18 industries, whereas only Hotels, Foodstores and RestaurantsVall retail-oriented
sectorsVappear to be increasing their real estate ownership levels. The decreasing trend
was most distinct for Business Services, which exhibits a gradual decrease in CRER
from 0.23 to 0.13 over the sample period, a decrease that can be observed in each single
national subsample. Aggregating the individual CRER-observations of all 18 industries
results in a general CRER for the overall economy. This overall CRER decreases
steadily from 0.34 (1992), 0.33 (1995), 0.32 (1998) to 0.29 (2000) and an F-statistic of
69.25 clearly illustrates that the difference between these annual averages are sig-
nificant.7 It is important to not that part of this downward trend in real estate ownership is
only visible due to the Ftraditional_ accounting standards, in which lease assets and
liabilities are not shown on the balance sheet. The new IFRS standards will do so
explicitly, which will make it hard to look at these real estate ownership trends in the
future: the worldwide adoption of these standards will create a structural break in the
CRER observations. To conclude, corporate real estate ownership is decreasing over
time, varies significantly across industries, and varies less strongly across countries.
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3. Methodology
Having quantified and examined real estate ownership internationally, it is time to turn to
the second portion of this paper, in which we analyze the firms_ stock performances. We
will link these results to the previously reported real asset ownership structures. The
stock performance is analyzed using a single index model, which quantifies both the
historic return and risk characteristics, using the following standard equation:
Ri; t  Rft ¼ i; t þ i; t Rmt  Rftð Þ þ "i; t ð2Þ
in which Ri, t denotes the total stock return of firm i, over period t, Rft represents the risk-
free rate of return over period t, Rmt is the national market return over period t, i, t
denotes systematic risk and quantifies the sensitivity of a stock of firm i to movements in
the national stock market occurring in period t, and i, t is Jensen’s alpha, which denotes
the difference between the mean total return earned by a stock and the equilibrium return
that should have been earned by the stock given the market conditions and its systematic
risk. In other words, Jensen’s alpha is the intercept in the regression of stock excess
returns on the market excess returns.
Due to real estate’s low systematic risk (beta), we might expect firms with relatively
high real estate holdings to be associated with lower betas compared to their peers. On
the other hand we may also reason that firms with relatively low betas to start with will
have low cost of capital and therefore will be capable of acquiring real estate at a more
competitive price. Low risk firms will therefore be more likely to end up with relatively
high corporate real estate ownership levels. This creates a situation in which simul-
taneous relationships can be at work. To analyze the relationship between corporate real
estate ownership and stock performance we will therefore use a two-stage least squares
procedure8 by calibrating the following model for explaining both the cross-sectional
variations in systematic risk and the Jensen alpha:
i; t ¼ 0 þ 1CR^ERi; t þ 2Leveragei þ 3 ln Sizei þ
X8
i¼ 1
iCDi
þ
X17
j¼ 1
jIDj þ i; t ð3Þ
i; t ¼ 0 þ 1CR^ERi; t þ 2Leveragei þ 3 ln Sizei þ
X8
i¼ 1
iCDi
þ
X17
j¼ 1
jIDj þ i; t ð4Þ
The equations relate a firm’s equity beta,9 and Jensen alpha to the corresponding pre-
dicted corporate real estate ratio (CREˆR), firm leverage, company size and includes both
country (CDi) and industry dummies (IDj) to control for the differences that exist across
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countries and industries. Instead of using the observed CRERs this model uses a pre-
dicted CRER from a reduced form equation, with the lagged CRER, company size, firm
leverage, and a poor performance dummy10 as instrumental variables.
4. Empirical results
Given the vast size of the sample and analysis we present the results of the analysis in
separate subsections. First we present and discuss the stock performance characteristics
resulting from the single index model. We continue by studying the relationship between
these risk and return measures and the corresponding real estate ownership ratios.
4.1. Stock performance
By relating the historic excess stock return of each firm to the movements of the
corresponding national index we gather insights in the risk and return profile of each
individual firm. Table 3 summarizes the main outcomes of this single index analysis. The
results regarding industry beta exhibit a strong variation across the different industries
with the highest systematic risk for firms in the Electronics and Communication (high-
tech) industries. At the other end of the spectrum we find industries like Agriculture,
Table 3. Industrial beta and return statistics, 1997Y2000.
AU CA FR GR HK JP NL UK US
Avg.
beta
Avg.
return
Agriculture 0.31 0.10 0.07 Y Y 0.68 Y 0.41 0.25 0.32 j2.80%
Mining 0.84 0.26 0.15 0.11 Y 0.58 Y 0.33 0.72 0.54 4.49%
Food and tobacco 0.65 Y 0.21 0.16 0.60 0.56 0.55 0.21 0.51 0.45 j1.23%
Textile Y Y 0.01 0.20 0.47 0.73 0.41 0.35 0.48 0.53 j8.32%
Publishing 0.72 0.27 0.60 0.24 1.03 0.75 0.30 0.80 0.53 0.61 2.13%
Chemicals 0.98 0.53 0.30 0.27 1.35 0.67 0.90 0.54 0.83 0.70 10.62%
Petroleum 0.82 0.09 0.28 0.16 2.74 0.75 0.56 0.31 0.55 0.55 5.24%
Electronics 1.24 0.86 0.46 0.38 1.17 0.99 0.62 1.02 1.49 1.15 14.80%
Transportation 0.97 0.27 0.27 0.22 1.03 0.54 0.70 0.47 1.00 0.68 0.12%
Communication 1.09 0.64 1.15 1.11 1.02 1.30 1.47 1.68 1.55 1.35 9.63%
Utilities 0.91 0.06 0.48 0.13 0.64 0.34 Y 0.18 0.20 0.23 3.83%
Restaurants 0.58 0.10 0.32 0.33 Y 0.50 0.30 0.40 0.46 0.45 j2.43%
Food-stores Y 0.20 0.29 Y 0.55 0.56 Y 0.61 0.53 0.55 4.33%
Hotels 0.46 1.01 0.27 0.24 0.75 0.50 Y 0.61 0.82 0.58 j3.04%
Personal services 0.82 Y Y Y Y 0.54 Y 0.35 0.67 0.58 3.49%
Business services 1.43 1.04 0.90 0.50 2.09 1.09 0.71 1.35 1.49 1.30 18.14%
Healthcare 0.73 0.29 0.31 0.20 Y 1.38 Y 0.44 0.67 0.62 12.23%
Business advisory 1.13 0.53 0.90 0.46 0.99 0.69 0.21 0.61 0.80 0.69 6.18%
Notes: The average returns are computed as arithmetic average total returns in US dollars for the period January
1997 through December 2000.
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Utilities and Food and Tobacco, which are involved in producing the more basic needs of
life, and which exhibit relatively low sensitivities to movements in the overall market.
When comparing national beta averages we occasionally document strong deviations
from the overall average, which can partly be explained by the small size of some of the
subsamples, and the occasional dominance of certain industries.11 Overall, the beta
results from Table 3 corroborate with standard literature in which similar cross-industrial
variations have been well documented.
The last column of Table 3 provides the arithmetic12 average annual total returns of
each industry. Again these statistics reveal a strong variation across industries, which is
in line with the corresponding variation in beta.
4.2. Real estate ownership and stock performance
Having quantified both corporate real estate ownership and stock performance, we turn
to the relationship between both variables. As a first step in the study of the interrelation
between corporate real estate holdings and firm performance we start with a plain
comparative correlation analysis.
The first column of Table 4 lists the average correlation coefficients between a firm’s
CRER and the average annual total stock return (ATR). These coefficients indicate a
significantly negative relationship between both variables, which corroborates with the
common notion that the real estate risk-return profile is modest compared to the
corporate activities undertaken by most firms in the sample. For high yielding industries
like Communications and Business Services the real estate ownershipVstock return
relationship appears to be significantly negative, while this relationship turns out positive
for low yielding industries like Agriculture and Restaurants. Obviously this crude
method covers only one side of the performance medal, since risk is lacking in these
comparisons. To repeat the exercise with a risk-adjusted return measure we also derived
correlation coefficients on the relationship between CRER and Jensen’s alpha. The
correlation coefficients correspond largely with the coefficients on the non-risk adjusted
returns and again, a generally negative relationship is found.
Regarding risk we computed two series of correlation coefficients. The first column of
this risk section of Table 4 lists the average correlation coefficients between the
individual CRERs and the corresponding equity betas. In general, the results exhibit a
significantly negative relationship. Apparently companies with large real estate holdings
tend to be associated with the lowest betas, or perhaps vice versa, firms with the lowest
betas have the highest real estate ownership levels. Low beta firms face relatively low
cost of capital and are therefore expected to have less trouble in financing their corporate
real estate holdings using their access to Fcheap debt._ If this line of thought is accepted
we would expect to find a positive relationship between corporate real estate ratios and
debt ratios. The results in the fourth column of Table 4 support this notion and list
positive correlation coefficients between both ratios. In order to isolate the influence of
the corporate real estate factor in a more precise manner, we continue the analysis using
multivariate regressions in which we can control for the variation in leverage.
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4.3. Regression analysis
In order to deal with the multicollinearity regarding leverage and real estate ownership
and to incorporate the simultaneity of the relationship that may be underlying this matter
we regress both beta and alpha on the Fpredicted_ CRER resulting from the first stage
regression, and on company size, leverage and a set of dummies correcting for dif-
ferences between industries and national samples. Table 5 summarizes the main results
originating from these regressions.
Panel A of Table 5 focuses on the cross-sectional variation in firm risk and gives
support to the earlier results of the preceding correlation analysis. The coefficient
regarding the corporate real estate ratio is negative and is statistically significant.
Locking corporate financial resources in relatively safe real estate assets apparently
reduces a firm’s systematic risk exposure. In order to test the robustness of this outcome
we also ran the same set of regressions for separate industries. This analysis is limited to
the seven industries for which we have enough observations, not only across the sample
as a whole, but also within each individual country. The results are provided in the lower
Table 4. Correlation coefficients between CRER and return and risk.
SIC n
Return Risk
Correl.
CRER,ATRa
Correl.
CRER,
Correl.
CRER,e
Correl.
CRER,DR
Agriculture 29 0.19 0.19 0.07 0.05
Mining 318 0.07 0.05 j0.15 0.21*
Food and Tobacco 350 j0.07 j0.06 j0.013 0.10
Textile 124 j0.17 j0.13 0.32* 0.13
Publishing 132 j0.21* j0.14 j0.19* j0.13
Chemicals 628 j0.35* j0.31* j0.27* 0.35*
Petroleum 48 j0.13 0.04 j0.16 0.24
Electronics 676 j0.24* j0.20* j0.11* 0.24*
Transportation 118 j0.04 j0.06 j0.01 0.37*
Communication 259 j0.28* j0.30* 0.02 0.40*
Utility 238 j0.14* j0.12 j0.31* 0.24*
Restaurants 127 0.12 0.01 j0.06 0.24*
Food-stores 119 j0.04 j0.10 j0.07 0.20*
Hotels 61 j0.39* j0.40* j0.19 0.19
Personal Services 21 0.04 0.12 j0.51* 0.31
Business Services 1,109 j0.21* j0.17* j0.24* 0.38*
Health Care 75 j0.19 j0.16 j0.31* 0.17
Business Advisory 205 j0.25* j0.20* j0.04* 0.36*
Overall 4,636 j0.17* j0.17* j0.26* 0.38*
a These correlation coefficients quantify the relationships between the corporate real estate ratio (CRER) and the
Average Total Return (ATR), Jensen’s alpha (), the Beta ( ) and the Debt Ratio (DR). Correlation coefficients
market with * are statistically significant at a 5% level.
CORPORATE REAL ESTATE OWNERSHIP IMPLICATIONS 439
T
a
b
le
5
.
T
w
o
st
ag
e
le
as
t
sq
u
ar
es
re
g
re
ss
io
n
o
u
tp
u
t.
F
a
ct
o
rs
C
o
u
n
tr
y
d
u
m
m
y
C
o
C
R
E
R
S
iz
e
D
R
i
=
1
i
=
2
i
=
3
i
=
4
i
=
5
i
=
6
i
=
7
i
=
8
A
.
B
et
a
O
v
er
al
l
0
.3
6
*
j
0
.2
6
0
.0
3
*
j
0
.0
2
0
.2
3
*
j
0
.2
8
*
j
0
.3
4
*
j
0
.3
6
*
0
.2
5
*
0
.0
1
j
0
.2
1
*
0
.1
3
*
In
d
u
st
ry
d
u
m
m
y
j=
1
j=
2
j=
3
j=
4
j=
5
j=
6
j=
7
j=
8
j=
9
j=
1
0
j=
1
1
j=
1
2
j=
1
3
j=
1
4
j=
1
5
j=
1
6
j=
1
7
R
2
ad
j.
j
0
.0
2
0
.1
9
0
.0
4
0
.1
6
*
0
.0
9
0
.1
9
*
0
.0
6
0
.6
1
*
0
.2
6
0
.8
2
*
j
0
.2
4
0
.1
2
0
.0
4
0
.0
7
0
.7
5
*
0
.1
2
0
.1
7
0
.3
2
F
o
o
d
an
d
to
b
ac
co
0
.4
3
*
j
0
.1
6
j
0
.0
3
*
0
.1
8
0
.4
1
*
j
0
.0
9
j
0
.0
7
j
0
.1
1
0
.3
5
*
0
.3
1
*
0
.3
0
*
0
.3
1
*
0
.1
7
P
u
b
li
sh
in
g
0
.4
5
*
j
0
.7
9
*
0
.0
6
*
0
.8
0
j
0
.0
6
j
0
.5
3
*
j
0
.2
8
j
0
.4
1
0
.5
9
0
.1
7
j
0
.5
1
*
j
0
.3
0
*
0
.2
1
C
h
em
ic
al
s
0
.7
0
*
j
1
.1
4
*
0
.0
1
0
.6
0
*
0
.5
3
*
0
.0
2
j
0
.3
5
*
j
0
.3
1
*
0
.9
7
*
0
.1
8
*
0
.4
8
*
0
.1
9
*
0
.1
5
E
le
ct
ro
n
ic
s
0
.4
6
*
0
.2
1
0
.1
0
*
j
0
.3
2
*
0
.4
4
*
j
0
.1
3
j
0
.5
0
*
j
0
.4
9
*
0
.0
3
j
0
.0
2
j
0
.4
9
0
.4
3
*
0
.2
5
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
at
io
n
0
.0
8
j
0
.2
2
0
.0
6
*
0
.4
2
0
.2
0
j
0
.1
0
j
0
.2
1
j
0
.1
2
0
.5
1
*
0
.1
5
0
.4
3
0
.5
3
*
0
.3
5
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
1
.7
1
*
j
0
.2
7
j
0
.0
4
1
.7
3
*
j
0
.8
7
*
j
1
.2
3
*
j
0
.5
0
j
0
.5
3
j
0
.4
8
j
0
.3
2
j
0
.3
6
j
0
.2
4
0
.1
6
B
u
si
n
es
s
se
rv
ic
es
1
.3
3
*
j
0
.8
0
*
0
.0
4
*
j
0
.8
0
*
0
.2
4
j
0
.4
5
j
0
.5
1
*
j
0
.7
1
*
0
.6
4
j
0
.0
8
j
0
.6
3
0
.1
0
0
.1
1
440 BROUNEN AND EICHHOLTZ
B
.
A
lp
h
a
O
v
er
al
l
0
.7
6
*
j
0
.3
3
0
.0
0
*
j
0
.0
2
0
.2
6
0
.0
1
*
j
0
.0
7
j
0
.4
0
0
.5
4
0
.1
2
j
0
.1
7
0
.0
1
*
In
d
u
st
ry
d
u
m
m
y
j
=
1
j
=
2
j
=
3
j
=
4
j
=
5
j=
6
j=
7
j=
8
j=
9
j=
1
0
j=
1
1
j=
1
2
j=
1
3
j=
1
4
j=
1
5
j=
1
6
j=
1
7
R
2
ad
j.
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
0
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
1
0
.0
1
0
.1
0
F
o
o
d
an
d
to
b
ac
co
j
0
.5
8
j
0
.2
3
0
.0
8
j
0
.5
9
0
.4
9
0
.8
1
0
.1
0
0
.4
8
j
0
.1
6
0
.2
1
1
.2
5
1
.0
6
*
0
.0
6
P
u
b
li
sh
in
g
j
0
.8
5
j
0
.9
8
0
.1
8
*
j
0
.3
6
j
0
.4
1
0
.3
4
0
.1
6
j
0
.0
6
3
.0
3
*
0
.5
5
j
0
.7
1
0
.2
9
0
.1
1
C
h
em
ic
al
s
j
0
.6
9
j
0
.4
1
0
.1
4
*
j
2
.6
2
*
3
.1
9
*
1
.2
5
1
.1
4
0
.0
6
2
.3
4
*
0
.7
1
1
.0
0
2
.0
1
*
0
.1
2
E
le
ct
ro
n
ic
s
0
.3
7
j
1
.2
6
0
.1
4
*
3
.4
0
*
j
0
.3
9
2
.5
4
*
j
0
.2
9
j
0
.4
7
0
.8
0
0
.2
8
0
.5
2
1
.2
3
*
0
.1
4
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
at
io
n
j
0
.3
4
0
.7
4
0
.1
1
j
3
.4
9
*
1
.0
5
0
.9
6
1
.1
5
0
.4
5
j
0
.2
1
j
0
.0
2
0
.7
8
0
.4
0
0
.1
1
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
2
.6
0
*
j
5
.0
3
*
0
.0
1
j
1
.4
3
1
.3
2
0
.6
3
j
0
.8
4
1
.8
8
0
.0
6
1
.0
2
j
0
.1
9
0
.0
0
0
.0
6
B
u
si
n
es
s
se
rv
ic
es
j
0
.2
4
j
2
.2
4
*
0
.3
6
*
j
1
.3
2
0
.8
2
0
.9
2
j
0
.7
5
j
1
.1
2
1
.6
5
0
.7
4
*
j
1
.9
5
0
.0
9
0
.1
3
N
o
te
s:
T
h
e
co
u
n
tr
y
d
u
m
m
ie
s
co
n
tr
o
l
fo
r
n
at
io
n
al
v
ar
ia
ti
o
n
s,
w
h
er
e
i
=
1
is
A
u
st
ra
li
a,
2
is
C
an
ad
a,
3
is
F
ra
n
ce
,
4
is
G
er
m
an
y
,
5
is
H
o
n
g
K
o
n
g
,
6
is
Ja
p
an
,
7
is
T
h
e
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s,
8
is
th
e
U
n
it
ed
S
ta
te
s.
T
h
e
in
d
u
st
ry
d
u
m
m
ie
s
co
n
tr
o
l
fo
r
cr
o
ss
-i
n
d
u
st
ri
al
v
ar
ia
ti
o
n
s,
w
h
er
e
j
=
1
is
A
g
ri
cu
lt
u
re
,
2
is
M
in
in
g
,
3
is
F
o
o
d
,
4
is
T
ex
ti
le
,
5
is
P
u
b
li
sh
in
g
,
6
is
C
h
em
ic
al
s,
7
is
P
et
ro
le
u
m
,
8
is
E
le
ct
ro
n
ic
s,
9
is
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
at
io
n
,
1
0
is
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
,
1
1
is
U
ti
li
ti
es
,
1
2
is
R
es
ta
u
ra
n
ts
,
1
3
is
F
o
o
d
st
o
re
s,
1
4
is
H
o
te
ls
,
1
5
is
P
er
so
n
al
S
er
v
ic
es
,
1
6
is
B
u
si
n
es
s
S
er
v
ic
es
,
an
d
1
7
is
H
ea
lt
h
S
er
v
ic
es
.
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
m
ar
k
ed
w
it
h
*
ar
e
st
at
is
ti
ca
ll
y
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
at
a
5
%
le
v
el
.
CORPORATE REAL ESTATE OWNERSHIP IMPLICATIONS 441
half of Panel A. Apart from the Electronics industry all subsamples exhibit the same
negative relationship between CRER and beta.
Regarding the effects of real asset investments on stock outperformance we perform a
similar analysis, in which we first regress Jensen’s alpha on the predicted CRER and the
controlling variables for all companies, and then repeat the analysis on a sector-by-sector
basis. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 5. For the overall regression, we find a
negative, but insignificant relationship between relative real estate holdings and risk-
adjusted stock performance. However, the sector-by-sector analysis shows that the effect
of corporate real estate ownership on outperformance is to a large extent driven by the
sector the company operates in. Although we generally find a negative effect, the
regression coefficient differs quite substantially. For the Communication sector, it is
j5.03 and significant, and for Business Services it is a significant j2.24. On the other
hand, we find a positive but not statistically coefficient for Transportation. Note,
however, that the sample of companies in the Transportation sector is much smaller than
for Communication and Business Services. These results indicate that corporate real
estate performance effects are partly sector-driven, which makes a lot of sense given the
variance in the strategic importance of real estate for companies in different industries.
For Communication and Business Services, real estate is a non-strategic tool, while
having an expedition center at the exactly right location can derive substantial cost
savings for a Transport company.
5. Conclusions
Institutional real estate investment and corporate real estate ownership are two sides of
the same coin. In the long run, growth of the institutional real estate market will have to
come from diminishing real estate ownership by companies. However, if real estate
ownership is beneficial to the performance of corporations, diminishing ownership will
not be very likely. To shed more light on this, we have studied the effects of corporate
real estate holdings on firm performance. We examined corporate real estate holdings
and the performance of non-real estate companies in 9 industrialized economies. Using
detailed balance sheet information we quantified the real estate ownership levels of 4,636
companies in these countries. Real estate ownership appears to vary primarily across
industries, with Business Services and Business Advisory on the low end and heavy
industries on the high end of the range. A second notable pattern in the corporate real
estate holdings was the change over time. For most of the 18 industries we have analyzed,
we documented a steady decrease in real estate ownership. Overall, the corporate real
estate ratio decreased significantly from 0.34 in 1992 to 0.29 in 2000.
After quantifying each firm’s risk and return characteristics in a single-index model by
computing betas and Jensen’s alphas, we linked these measures to corporate real estate
holdings in order to study their interrelationships. By applying both correlation and mul-
tivariate regression analysis we measured the effects of corporate real estate ownership
on firm risk and return. While controlling for variations in leverage, size, industry and
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country of origin we documented a negative influence of real estate holdings on sys-
tematic risk, which holds for a wide range of industries. We also find a generally negative
relationship between real estate ownership and risk-adjusted stock performance, but this
negative impact is only significant in the Communications and Business Services sectors.
For the Transportation sector, we find a positive relationship between real estate owner-
ship and corporate performance. These results may be explained by the different strategic
importance of real estate for various industries.
To conclude, our results show that corporate real estate holdings generally decrease
the risk and the return of a firm, but that the latter is not necessarily the case for all firms.
The sector in which a firm is active can make a crucial difference regarding this issue.
This implies that further research of the implications of corporate real estate ownership
will have to take industry sector into account in order to make meaningful inferences
regarding performance effects and corporate real estate strategy.
Appendix: Description of Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
SIC 0100Y0299 Agriculture
Agricultural productionVcrops
Livestock and animal specialties
SIC 1000Y1499 Mining
Metal mining
Coal mining
Oil and gas extraction
Mining and quarrying of nonmetallic mineral, except fuels
SIC 2000Y2199 Food and Tobacco
Food and kindred products
Tobacco products
SIC 2200Y2299 Textile mill products
SIC 2700Y2799 Publishing, printing and allied industries
SIC 2800Y2899 Chemicals and allied products
SIC 2900Y2999 Petroleum refining and related industries
SIC 3600Y3699 Electronic and other electrical equipment and component, except computer equipment
SIC 4400Y4599 Transportation
Water transportation
Transportation by air
SIC 4800Y4899 Communications
SIC 4900Y4999 Electric, gas, and sanitary services
SIC 5800Y5899 Eating and drinking places
SIC 5400Y5499 Food stores
SIC 7000Y7099 Hotels, rooming houses, camps, and other lodging places
SIC 7200Y7299 Personal Services (laundry services, beauty shops, funeral services, etc.)
SIC 7300Y7399 Business Services (advertising, employment agencies, computer rental, etc.)
SIC 8000Y8099 Health services
SIC 8700Y9799 Business Advisory (Engineering, accounting, research, management, and related services)
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Notes
1. IPD provides market values for the national IPD indices for Germany, France and the United Kingdom, and
also give estimates for the market coverage of these indices. In December 2002, the German index had a
market value of 35 billion, with a coverage of 30%; the French index had a 52.5 billion market value, with
a coverage of 57%; and the British index had a market value of 145 billion, with a coverage of 67%.
2. See Rodriguez and Sirmans (1996) for a thorough discussion of the most relevant literature.
3. The sample is based on Compustat’s Global Vantage universe for the 9 chosen countries. The only
difference is that we exclude banks and insurance companies, due to the fact that their asset bases are
difficult to compare with those of other firms. This is in line with previous research (see Deng and Gyourko,
1999; Seiler et al., 2001). In order to avoid potential survivorship bias we have repeated the selection
procedure for each of the four sample years.
4. More detailed information regarding the industrial SIC-classification is presented in the Appendix.
5. We are aware of the distorting effect of equipment in this variable. PPE, however, offers the best available
proxy for real estate ownership and the consistent construction method of Compustat guarantees a fair
international comparison. Previous studies on corporate real estate ownership like: Deng and Gyourko
(1999), Seiler et al. (2001) and Ciochetti and Shilling (2002) have used PPE as well.
6. Both values are book values, such that potential endogeneity problems biasing the estimates are reduced to
the minimum.
7. The resulting F-statistics needs to be compared to the matching df(3,15998) F0.05 critical point of 2.60.
8. In this situation in which the explanatory variable CRER is endogenous applying OLS would yield
estimates of the coefficients that suffer from the simultaneity bias, causing inconsistency in the estimates.
9. We are aware of the correlation between leverage and corporate real estate ownership and its influence on
the equity beta and we control for multicollinearity complications by adding the variables separately. Deng
and Gyourko (1999) used the asset beta as a proxy for systematic risk, which forced them to make an
assumption regarding the value of the systematic risk of debt. They assumed the same debt beta for all
sectors. While that assumption may be realistic for a study focusing on one country, that is less likely to be
the case for an international study like ours, which is why we have chosen to use the equity beta as the
yardstick for systematic risk. However, to test the validity of that approach, we have also done the
regression analysis with an asset beta setting similar to Deng and Gyourko and find no significant difference
in the coefficient for corporate real estate ownership (j0.27 for equity beta approach and j0.26 for asset
beta approach). The only difference relates to the leverage variable, which turns significantly negative for
the asset beta, while it is insignificant for the equity beta.
10. It has been documented that in times of financial slumps firms are more likely to sell their real estate
holdings in order to increase their financial strength. To include this phenomenon into the set of regressions
we constructed a dichotomous dummy variable that divides the sample into firms with average annual stock
returns below and above j10%.
11. The Agriculture industry sample consists of only 29 companies, therefore national subsamples tend to
become small and averages become less reliable due to the lack of numbers.
12. We compute arithmetic mean returns in order to illustrate the great variance in average performance over
time.
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